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Voice of the Exploited Majority:
Claude Kirk and the 1970 Manatee County
Forced Busing Incident
by Benjamin Houston
t 7:35 a.m. on Monday, April 6, 1970, Governor Claude R.
strode into an unfamiliar office in Bradenton,
orida, a small Gulf Coast town sandwiched between St.
Petersburg and Sarasota. The new quarters belonged to the
Manatee County superintendent of schools, and the previous occupant, fired by Kirk, was now replaced by the governor himself.
Kirk's self-promotion was prompted by Manatee's capitulation to a
federal court order mandating immediate busing of schoolchildren with only nine weeks remaining in the academic term. Yet, the
governor's conduct also marked a new level of commitment for a
county associated since 1954 with a pronounced reluctance to integrate local schools. His "coup" ushered in a week of dramatic tension, including a charged courtroom scene and a darkly
comic-but genuinely dangerous-stand-off between Kirk's aides
and federal marshals. By the conclusion of the crisis, however,
seemingly very little had changed: children still traveled miles to
unfamiliar schools; Kirk's withdrawal from the superintendent's
office foreshadowed his subsequent defeat for re-election in the
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following November; and the county, indeed the nation, remained
deeply polarized by the seemingly benign symbol of yellow school
buses.
Years before vigorous dissension wracked Denver, Charlotte,
and Boston, Manatee County exhibited similar contempt for busing
as a tool to implement the Brown v. Board ofEducation decision. Yet,
most scholars of busing touch only superficially on the Manatee
episode.2 More extended treatments lack crucial contexts and
remain content to glibly pigeonhole the Manatee episode as a late
example of the "massive resistance" of the 1 9 5 0 ~This
. ~ essay argues
instead that Claude Kirk's involvement in Manatee reflected a political strategy that blended old and new, borrowing tactics of the past
while speaking to a fresh constituency and its values. Although
Kirk's behavior echoed the actions of former Southern governors,
he represented as well a new confluence of language and values tailored to white voters whose localized self-interest in matters of education and community control trumped the difficult issues of a
Gary Orfield, Must We Bus? Segregated Schools and Natdonal Policy (Washington
D.C., 1978);Davison M. Douglas, Reading Writingand Race: The Desegregation of
the Charlotte Schools (Chapel Hill, 1995); idem, ed., The Develupmerzt of School
Busing as a Desegregation Remed'y (New York, 1994);idem, ed., The Public Debate
Ooer Busing and Attempts to Restrict Its Use (New York, 1994);Richard Pride and
J. David Woodard, The Burden of Busing The Politics of Desegregation in Nashville,
Tennessee (Knoxville, 1985); Lino A. Graglia, Disaster by Decree: The Supreme
Comt Decisions on h e and The Schools (Ithaca, N.Y.,1976);J. Harvie Wilkinson
111, Fmm Brown to Bakke: The Supreme Covrt and School Integration 1954-1 978
(New York, 1979).
Passing treatments include Orfield, Must We Bus? 329; David R. Colburn and
Richard K. Scher, Flmida's Gubm~torialPolitics in the Twentidh Centuly
(Tallahassee, Fla., 1980), 234-5, as well as their "Race Relations and Florida
Gubernatorial Politics Since the B m Decision," Florida Historical Quarter4 53
(April 1975):153-69; Billy B. Hathorn, "Cramer v. Kirk: The Florida
Republican Schism of 1970," Florida Historical Quarterly 68 (April 1990): 403
26; Gordon Harvey, A Quation of Justice: New South Garam and Educatim
(Tuscaloosa,Ala., 2002), 67, 68.
The extended treatments are in chapter eight of Edmund F. Kallina Jr.,
Claude Kirk and the Politics of C o n , t a t i o n (Gainesville, Fla., 1993); Raymond
Rapp, "The Failure of Massive Resistance: The Law and Social Change in
Manatee County, Florida" ( M A thesis, University of South Florida, 1972);
Darryl Paulson and Milly St.Julien, "Desegregating Public Schools in Manatee
and Pinellas County, 19541971,"Tampa Bay History 7 (spring/summer 1985):
30-41; Randy Sanders, "Rasslinga Governor: Defiance, Desegregation, Claude
Kirk and the Politics of Richard Nixon's Southern Strategy," Florida Historical
Quarterly 80 (winter 2002): 332-59; idem, Mighty Peculiar Elections: The New
South Gubernatorial Campaigns of 1970 and the Changing Politics of Race,
(Gainesville, Ha., 2002), 77-112. See also Lisa McGirr, SubuTban Wammm:The
On'gim of the New American Rtght (Princeton, N.J., 2001), 8-9,46, 74,94.
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society still grappling with racial integration. These voters-not
necessarily linked to any particular region--often provoked and
often responded to political posturing. Their beliefs and actions
should remind historians that politicians of the 1970s, despite their
differences, had more in common than previously acknowledged.
Born in California in 1926, but with childhood stints in Illinois
and Alabama, Claude Kirk served in the military and obtained a law
degree before settling into a prosperous career as a businessman in
Jacksonville. These early years in as a young professional prepared
Kirk well to sense and exploit shifts in politics and public opinion.
Serious issues plagued Jacksonville in the 1960s, including a corrupt local government unwilling to solve lingering problems with
education, race relations, and the environment. According to biographer Edmund F. Kallina Jr., such problems "infuriated Kirk and
"offended his idealism," giving Kirk ample opportunity to use his
sarcastic wit, keen political insight, and charismatic abilities to
shake up Florida politics. After an inauspicious beginning in politics, Kirk vaulted to the governor's mansion after being fortunate
enough to draw Miami mayor (and racial liberal) Robert King High
as his opponent. (High had defeated segregationist and fellow
Democrat Haydon Burns in a run-off. The bruising primary fight
permitted Kirk to paint High as ultra-liberal and therefore suspect
in the eyes of many Floridians.) Thus, in 1966, Kirk became the
first Republican governor of Florida since Reconstruction and
made Florida, along with Arkansas, the first Southern state with a
GOP governor. He immediately set out to break the Democratic
Party's stranglehold on state political power. Kallina notes that
Kirk's chief weapons in this endeavor were a politics "visceral in
nature" combined with a "sardonic manner of expression," a conspicuous love of political showmanship, and a belief "that the end
justified the means in achieving his political goals."4
Kirk's abrasive style accounted for both the best and worst qualities of his term and continues to color historical treatments of his
tenure. It is tempting to conflate Kirk's showmanship with the
demagogic tradition of "standing-in-the-schoolhousedoor"favored
by many Southern politicians. Certainly nothing defined Kirk
4.

Kallina, Claude Kirk and the Politics of Cm$hntatim, 145, quotations on 22-24;
Alexander P. Lamis, Thc TweParty South (NewYork, 1984), 182; Claude Kirk,
interview with Julian M. Pleasants, 29 October 1998, Samuel Proctor Oral
History Program, University of Florida, Gainesville (hereafter SPOHP-UF).
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(whom the N m Yafr Times said "played governor like Errol Flynn
played Captain Bloodn)more than his celebrated patenting of "the
politics of confrontation," pursuing political mileage through highly publicized aggressive encounters. In the case of Manatee County,
this tactic earned him frequent comparisons with those Southern
governors who staged similar symbolic confrontations against the
federal government. These comparisons persist although Kirk
attempted to distance himself from segregationists, as when he
stumped throughout Alabama in 1968 against George Wallace on
behalf of Richard Nixon. Journalist David Halberstam, writing in
that same year, noted that "Kirk is genuinely good on race, he
appears to have no prejudice." A number of anecdotes from his
administration suggest Kirk's unwillingness to defer to antiquated
racial custom^.^ Whether this led to actual substantive change for
African American Floridians is open to interpretation. But historians' comparisons of Kirk to massive resisters is misleadingly simplistic-it
ignores the extent to which it behooved Kirk to
disassociate himself such sentiments, even as he tapped into the
same feelings that George Wallace, for example, articulated mastefilly for a national audience. Unlike the massive resistance era,
it became distasteful to many constituencies in the 1970s to identify openly with segregation, even as these voters favored policies that
included segregation. Kirk reflected that shift in attitude.
Kirk's 1966 election signaled a tentative but significant political reorientation throughout the state. Since the Eisenhower presidency, Florida's burgeoning Republican population had made
incremental inroads upon the state's solidly Democratic affinities.
5.

For Kirk as demagogue, see New York T i m , 7, 12 April 1970; St. Petenburg
T i m , 10,12 April 1970; Neusweek, 20 April 1970,40-42;Time, 27 April 1970compare to Time, 20 April 1970, 16, which acknowledged that Kirk was
"almost a liberal (by Florida standards) on racial matters"; Peter D. Klingman,
Neither DiRF Nor S u d : A Hiskny of the RepdIican Party in Florida 1867-1970
(Gainesville, Fla., 1984), 17576; Robert W. Hooker, "Busing, Governor
Askew, and the Florida Primary," N m South 27 (spring 1972): 27; Rapp, "The
Failure of Massive Resistance," 3-4; Richard K. Scher, Politics an The New South
(New York, 1992), 388; David Halberstarn, "Claude Kirk and the Politics of
Promotion," Harper's Magazine, May 1968, 33-34, which also draws a parallel
between Kirk's and Wallace's similarities; Sanders, "Rassling a Governor,"
334; Kirk interview; David R Colburn, "Florida Governors Confront the
Brown Decision," in An Uncertain Tradition: Constitutimtalismand the Histmy of
the South, eds., Kermit L. Hall and James W. Ely (Athens, Ga., 1989), 34547;
Gilder quotation from Kallina, Chudi Kink and the Politics of ConJi-ontation,180;
Nathaniel Reed, interview with Julian M. Pleasants, 2, 3 November 2000,
SPOHP-UF.
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Manatee County's political &liation was typical of the increasingly
Republican "horseshoe" of the 1960s and 1970s which straddled
central and southern Florida. With the linchpin in Orlando, an
upsidedown U along both coasts of the peninsula signaled the
parameters of Republican support in Florida.
Significantly, this horseshoe was comprised predominately by
people only belatedly Floridian, an onrush of migrating retirees
and young professionals from the Northeast and Midwest. These
citizens settled in the coastal cities of Florida and immediately registered according to their traditional preference, which is to say,
Republican -a dimension frequently ignored by historical treatments of Kirk's intrusion into Manatee. Demographic statistics
from the 19'70 census indicate thatjust under half of Manatee's residents hailed from not only outside Florida but outside the South,
and the county's native Floridians equaled the number of migrants
born in the north central United States. Such voters provided a
political base for Kirk before 1970: Manatee County school board
attorney Kenneth W. Cleary, born in Michigan, was one of Kirk's
county chairmen; and school board member Thomas Sprenger,
raised in Indiana and Kentucky, campaigned with Kirk across the
county in 1966.6
To what extent, then, was Kirk's stand-in-the-schoolhousedoor
attitude particularly Southern? It is risky to attribute this dynamic
to the Manatee situation when much of Kirk's intended political
constituency did not hail from Dixie. The solid Democratic South
that rallied behind the demagogic stances of George Wallace, Orval
Faubus, and Ross Barnett was fragmenting by this time. Rather, the
6.

1970 Census of Population from Florida, Part 11, Section 1, Table 119, Eaton
Florida History Room, Manatee County Central Library, Bradenton, Fla. On
Manatee and Florida's burgeoning Republicanism, see Jack Bass and Walter
DeVries, The T r a m f m t i o n of Southern Politics: Social Change and Political
Consequence Since 1945 (New York, 1976), 107-35, 417-19; Manning Dauer,
'Florida: The Different State," in The ChangingPolitics of the South, ed. William
C. Havard (Baton Rouge, La., 1972), 92-164; Raymond Arsenault and Gary R.
Mormino, "From Dixie to Dreamland: Demographic and Cultural Change in
Florida, 1880-1980," in Shades of the Sunbelt: Essays on Ethnicity, Race, and the
Urban South, eds. Randall M. Miller and George E. Pozetta (New York, 1988),
179-84; Colburn, "Florida Governors Confront the Brown Decision," 328;
Lamis, The TweParty South, 179; Morton D. Winsberg, "Regional Migration
Streams to Different Parts of Florida," Southeastffn Geographer 33 (May 1993):
117, 120. See also Kenneth W. Cleary, interview with the author, 18 April
2000; Thomas Sprenger, interview with the author, 15August 2000, both in
SPOHP-UF.
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new mixture of non-Southerners coexisting with Southerners signaled that Manatee's and Kirk's disdain for busing was not confined to supporters of massive resistance.
This blurred regionalism among its citizens is all the more
highlighted by Manatee's past, reminiscent of more traditional
Southern attitudes to local racial tensions in the post-World War I1
era. Largely dependent on agriculture and tourism for their livelihood, whites frowned on African Americans' self-assertive acts. An
active Citizens' Council, a sheriff affiliated openly with the Ku Klux
Klan, and an unsympathetic white populace stifled civil rights activity during the 1950s and 1960s. Divisions persisted between the
county seat of Bradenton, and Palmetto, north of Bradenton and
across the Manatee River, where the majority of local blacks lived
and coexisted in uneasy tension with lower-class whites, displaying
particularly brittle race relations.
But by 1970, the racial attitudes of Manatee County-nce
a
stronghold of segregationist sentiment, now a blend of Dixie,
Midwest, and Northeast-reflected the reality that the South was
but a darker reflection of a wider American tendency. The county's evolution manifested racial attitudes that transcended geography. Florida, and Kirk, demonstrated these shifting categories. As
the decade unfolded, electoral patterns throughout the state swung
without any clear trends between parties, candidates, and the
dynamics of an enormously varied state. Caught between party loyalties of the past and a growing identification with a new political
shift, the state was undergoing internal transformation as part of
the Sun Belt phenomenon, stocked with citizens moving into a r a p
idly urbanizing, socially mobile society. Bradenton Herald reporter
Jane Evers, who covered the Manatee school board during the integration and busing years, made the connection explicit:
"Bradenton and the urban area around it . . . retains an awful lot of
a small-town feeling. Sarasota thinks they are very cosmopolitan
and sophisticated. Bradenton is more of a small-town type of thing.
. . . It is more like a Midwestern small town."7
Throughout the 1960s, Bradenton's school system found itself
hampered by mediocrity, lacking adequate financing and perilously close to losing its accreditation. The community feared that

- --

7. Jane Ever~,interviewwith the author, 19 April 2000, SPOHP-UF. See McGirr,
Suburban Wammms,
which, while about California, informed my analysis.
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educational deficiencies would repel industry, despite the Gulf
Coast's swelling prosperity. But these issues, compounded by
Manatee's growth, outpaced the county's ability to deliver solutions. The school system found itself taxed by increasinglystringent
directives from the federal government to hasten integration,
which largely went ignored. Despite a 1965 NAACP lawsuit, the
Manatee County Board of Public Instruction engaged in conspicuous footdragging, allowing only token integration throughout the
county?
The chief point of resistance to integration and later to busing
derived from the school board's insistence upon maintaining
neighborhood schools. Both whites and African Americans used
neighborhood schools as educational and cultural anchors. These
schools, rooted in patterns of residential segregation, did not lend
themselves to integrated education. By using the so-called "freedom-ofchoice" measures favored by many Southern school systems, which provided for token integration while ensuring a
predominantly segregated status quo, Manatee County maintained
neighborhood schooling with minimum disruption. Such tactics
remained common after the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Still, the federal
government judged Manatee County to be in compliance with
national standards for desegregation. Each year brought an
increased percentage of African Americans to integrated schools,
although the pace remained glacial and only tiny numbers of blacks
were admitted into all-white schools. A two-mill school tax rejected
by voters on November 3,1965, and stricter guidelines on desegregation compliance handed down by the federal government on
March 1,1966, only served to deepen problems faced by the school
system. Swelling numbers of both black and white children taxed
the resources of a school system already struggling with overall
deterioration.
The busing issue also folded into a larger struggle for power in
late 1960s Manatee County. After closing a school in Myakka City
on the eastern edge of the county, and earning the displeasure of
8.

The bulk of my text on Manatee County's past is excerpted from Rapp's
extensive "The Failure of Massive Resistance." His study suffers from some
interpretative holes as it confines itself largely to extensive newspaper
research. The NAACP lawsuit was Caroline Harvest et al. v. Board of Public
Instwtion of Manatee County et al., No. 6512-Civ.T (1965). With regards to
Palmetto, see Sprenger interview; Rapp, "The Failure of Massive Resistance,"
1-194.
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parents whose children faced a ninety-minute round-trip into
Bradenton, Superintendent J. Hartley Blackburn found himself
struggling to hold onto his job of twenty-plus years. Increased
teacher walk-outs, as part of the 1968 Florida teacher's strike, coupled with some racial clashes in county schools, further polarized
the political situation. In response, the elections of Thomas
Sprenger, C. W. Lacey, and Betty Rushmore gave Manatee County
a Republican-controlledschool board for the first time. The board
immediately made plans to switch from an elected to a boardappointed superintendent. The politicized atmosphere surrounding the school board became further charged in February 1968,
when the board voted three-to-two along partisan lines to reject recommendations from educators, including new superintendent Jack
M. Davidson, that the "freedom-of-choice"plan be replaced with a
geographical zoning plan. Zoning was attractive in that it relieved
overcrowding through more efficient use of available school space
while conforming to federal desegregation mandates. The board's
decision remained policy even after the Supreme Court's 1968
Green v. New Kent County (Virginia) ruling outlawing freedom-ofchoice plans. This important case required that school boards not
only refrain from segregating schools, which in practice resulted in
schools with token minorities of African Americans, but provide
immediate action to create schools not "racially identifiable." Green
also meant that judicial supervision, previously enforced unevenly
by the courts, would scrutinize recalcitrant school districts more
closely. In Manatee County, further litigation by the NAACP
prompted a January 9,1969, federal court order requiring Manatee
County to comply with these federal desegregation req~irements.~
The plan submitted to the federal court by the Manatee County
school administration pleased no one. In an attempt to relieve classroom overcrowding, the districting plan left four black schools
and seven white schools totally segregated. The plan, found deficient on May 8,1969, prompted a court order calling for a new plan
to integrate the four black schools. Against the advice of board
9.

Green v. New Kent County Schwl Boanl, 391 U.S. 430; Orfield, Must We Bus?, 14;
Graglia, Disaster by Decree, 66874; Willringon, From Bwwn to Bakke, 115-18. For
more on the 1968 Florida teacher's strike, see James Sullivan, "The Florida
Teacher Walkout in the Political Transition of 1968," in Southern Labm In
Transition, 19401995, ed. Robert H. Zeiger (Knoxville, Tenn., 1997), 205-29;
Rapp, "The Failure of Massive Resistance," 94101, 122-39; Sprenger interview; William Bashaw, interview with the author, 18 April 2000, SPOHP-UF.
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attorney Kenneth Cleary, the school board voted to request a new
trial on the grounds that desegregation would impair education
throughout Manatee County. Superintendent Davidson continued
lobbying for an increased 'compensatory programn for African
Americans that would best succeed if concentrated in the four allblack schools. Above all, white citizens recoiled from the prospect
of sending their children to previously all-black schools. The Nixon
administration's announcement that desegregation orders would
be eased occurred nearly simultaneously with harsher judgments
handed down by the federal court. These confusing cues heightened white resentment towards the school board, which undoubtedly encouraged the board's continuing intransigence, despite the
advice of their attorney and administrators. The board, again
against Cleary's pessimistic counsel, tried to forestall criticism by
appealing its case to the Fifth Circuit Court in New Orleans.lo
A stern rebuke from the Fifth Circuit, handed down on
December 12,1969,left federaljudge Ben Krentzmen with the duty
of enforcing Manatee's compliance. He ordered the school board
to seek advice from federal agencies. Accordingly, the Florida
School Desegregation Consulting Center, a subsidiary of the U.S.
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare based at the
University of Miami, reported to the school system three possible
options for compliance, designated Plans A, B, and C. Finding
Plans A and C inadequate, Krentzmen ordered that Plan B, along
with its mandated busing program, be instituted no later than April
6, 19'70, in a school year that had just nine weeks remaining.
Krentzmen, however, had permitted other school districts making
"excellent progress" to wait until September 19'70 to institute their
integration plans. *
At this point, Kirk interjected himself with a flurry of legal
actions, requesting interventions and respites by higher courts, all
of which were turned down. "From now on, I intend to be the
10. Rapp, "The Failure of Massive Resistance," 140-60; Sprenger interview;
Bashaw interview. St. Petersbug Times, 10, 11 April 1970, has a summary of
legal events leading to Manatee's court order.
11. Rapp, "The Failure of Massive Resistance,"161-77; St. Petersburg Times, 10, 11
April 1970. For more on Krentzmen, see St. Petersburg Tim, 10, 12 April
1970. Krentzmen also received a number of threats to his life, see St.
Petersburg Times, 15 April 1970. For more perspectives on Krentzmen, see
Mickey Newberger, interview with author, 17 April 2000; and Oscar
Blasingame, interview with the author, 20 April 2000, both in SPOHP-UF. All
interviewees for this project commented on Krentzmen generally.
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buffer between the school boards and the courts," said Kirk, who at
the same time went on to stress "that segregation has no place in a
democratic society." Significantly, he took these actions after consultation with Attorney General John Mitchell; press accounts of
the meeting conjectured that Kirk and Nixon planned to "snatch
the issue of school desegregation away from the Democrats." Kirk
also upped the ante by announcing plans to suspend any school
board complying with integration orders that prescribed "mass
forced busing." The Manatee school board included Kirk's pronouncements in its continued appeals for higher courts, all the way
to the U.S. Supreme Court, to stay Krentzmen's order. One article
noted the school board's resentment of being "'swept up in the tide
ofjudicial frustration'" after having "been twice ruled to be desegregated 'only to be told by another federal coun that the same sys
tem was not in compliance.'" School board attorney Kenneth
Cleary argued that desegregation had occurred by the opening of
the school year, " [blut the whites either sent their children to private schools or moved out of the zones. . . . [Tlhese schools have
resegregated because people have moved out."'*
After the U.S. Supreme Court demurred from intervening,
there seemed to be no way to evade busing for Manatee County
schools. Despite shrill cries of protest from segregationists, a
reported sharp increase of enrollment in private academies, and a
call from the Bradenton Herald for Judge Krentzmen's impeachment, most of the county seemed resigned. The HerQld noted that
school officials had met with Kirk and briefly discussed possible
interventions, but no decision was reached, and one source said
that Kirk would not make a move.13
On Sunday, April 5, the school board was summoned to an
emergency meeting with Lieutenant Governor Ray Osborne and
12. St. Petersburg Times, 23January, 1 April 1970; New YorR Times, 23January 1970;
Sanders, "Wrassling a Governor," 347-51.
13. Subsequent oral histories, however, suggest that the board may have been
aware of the impending act; see Even interview; Cleary interview; William
Maloy, interview with the author, 4 April 2000, SPOHP-UF; Kallina, Claude
Kirk and the Politics of Confrontation, 16872; Rapp, "The Failure of Massive
Resistance," 18&93; Bradimton H w 1 April 1970;. See St. Petemburg Tim,
l 0 , l l April 1970, for the sequence of events; Bradaton Hmld, 2,4 April 1970
on Kirk; Bradaton Heralcl, 4, 5 April 1970, regarding calls for Krentzrnen's
impeachment. Note also that, in February, Kirk made a similar attempt at
intervention in Daytona Beach but backed off when threatened with contempt of court charges; see N m York Tim, 12 April 19'10.
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various governor's aides. A Herald reporter was struck by the initially jovial atmosphere with lots of kidding and joking, but then
seriousness prevailed. Osborne read aloud the governor's executive order, citing in great detail the damage that court-ordered busing would inflict upon Manatee County schoolchildren in
mid-term. In denunciating the "sociological" plan of Krentzmen
and the attack on the Miami Desegregation Consulting Center (a
"private" outside group not connected with elected school officials), the order showed occasional hints of the bygone era of massive resistance. But the language also remained qualified: "The
action is not taken to defy the courts. . . . We are dedicated to compliance, not defiance." Rather, the order stressed Krentzmen's
"arbitrary actions" and defended Kirk's suspension order as an
expression of "the people of Florida" in "taking action to get a fair
hearing before the judiciary" on behalf of "the right to be heard. .
. . To seek redress of grievances . . . [and] To work out conflicts
within the law." The order ended with the odd paradox of Kirk
"most reluctantly" suspending "the valiant members of Manatee
County Board of Public Instruction . . . and their courageous and
eminently qualified Superintendent Dr. Jack Davidson."l4
The backlash began immediately. The Br&ton
HeraZd's editorial page, despite consistently denouncing the busing plan as
"obnoxious," lambasted Kirk. "Children Are Pawns: Kirk Antics
Inexcusable" was a typical headline. The newspaper also charged
Kirk with "political grandstanding . . . [and] attempting to exploit
the emotions of a citizenry which clearly is excited over misuse of
judicial authority." On Monday morning, Kenneth Cleary was welcomed with a phone call from Kirk who said, "Good morning, this
is your superintendent" and asked Cleary to serve as his attorney.
Cleary, turning down the request, informed Kirk that he was en
route to Tallahassee to convince the Florida Senate Committee on
Education to remove Kirk from his new position.15
Within the schools, chaos reigned as planned reconfigurations
based on the busing plan were overturned by Kirk's intervention.
14. Evers interview; Cleary interview; "Executive Order,"5 April 1970, Claude R.
Kirk Jr. Papers, Series 926, B>x 3, Florida State Archives, Tallahassee;
Brahton Herald, 6 April 1970; St. Petersbulg Times,6 April 19'70.
15. Bradenton Herald, 7 April 1970; Cleary interview. See also the prescient editorial from the Herald warning of "emotionalismnand "playingpolitics,"5 April
1970. The St. Petersbulg T i m , 7 April 1970, confirmed that Cleary and school
board chair Betty Rushmore met with the legislature in Tallahassee.
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First days of forced busing at Southeast High School in Manatee County, April
1970. Courtesy of Manatee Courtly Historical Society, Bradenton, Flu.

The arrival of sixth-graders at classrooms filled with desks sized for
firstgraders and lacking necessary textbooks prompted a frenzied
effort to return these items to their initial homes. Popular reaction
to Kirk's takeover, as reported by the Herald, ranged from "At least
he did something" to "Why didn't he just leave us alone?" As the
week wore on, however, white residents largely rallied to Kirk's side,
evinced by one resident who stated that if "Kirk tells the voters of
Manatee County he is running for God, he would get 95 per cent of
the vote." Clarified another: "The majority of the people are not
against integration of the schools. . . . But we are against forced busing" and "Our civil rights are being violated. . . . There should be
justice for all." Various organizations that protested forced-busing,
eventually cooperating under one umbrella as SONS (Save Our
Neighborhood Schools) and later FOC (Freedom of Choice), were
predictablyjubilant. l6
In the meantime, the NAACP led African American picketers
in vigils around school buildings to protest Kirk's intervention.
Other African Americans resisted the idea of busing as a method of
breaking up neighborhood schools, although their perspective was
16. Bradenton Herald, 10, 12 April 1970; St. Petersburg Times,10, 11, 12 April 1970;
Sanders, "Wrasslinga Governor,"352.
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quite complicated. As William Bashaw, assistant superintendent of
schools in the 1970s recalled, the loss of all-black Lincoln High
School, an anchor in the black community, was mourned by its former graduates: "It is a rather interesting thing that many of the
black students did not want to [integrate by busing]. They still have
reunions of the old Lincoln High School of the black people. They
were proud of their school and they did not want to lose it, which,
in effect, is what they did." Ahican Americans were caught in a
bind, torn between advancing the cause of integrating schools
while losing school ties that had fortified them in the hostile environment of segregation for years.
Even more galling was the reality that, after Kirk's withdrawal
from the school system, black students by an overwhelming majority were forced to ride buses to strange schools. As Bashaw put it,
referring to the postcrisis busing plan:
What it ended up doing was busing black students. There
was some logic in that,because there were population centers that were pockets of black studentswhich needed to be
broken up. For example, we could not have desegregated
Lincoln [High School] strictly on geographic lines,
because it would have been 75 to 80 percent black . . .when
you have 12 percent black countywide, obviously, the thing
to do is to divide those black children up. That is exactly
what we did.
Cleary said, "Well, the black people got caught in a bind here,
because they wanted the desegregation . . .but then when it h a p
pened, they are the ones who had to cope [with] getting bussed.
That was a mixed battle for them. Some of them felt, well, maybe
that is what we ought to do, and some of them felt it was not fair,
because we were not bussing the white children. . . . So,they got
caught in their own trap, in one matter of speaking, because they
wanted desegregation, but they did not want it all on their shoulders." African Americans fell victim to a numbers game, taking
two steps forward and one step back when it came to integration."
The white population of Manatee County,with few exceptions,
rallied under the banner of community autonomy in supporting
Kirk's actions. Many white citizens struck a note of wounded per-

17. Cleary interview; Bashaw interview.
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secution in lashing out at the federal government. A Bradenton
Her& editorial decried the situation as "yet another indication of
how the federaljudicial system has deteriorated. The constitution
has been tossed out the window. Common sense logic is ignored."
In a representative letter to the editor, one writer, after summarizing the results of a Gallup poll showing widespread disaffection
with busing among both blacks and whites, argued that such sentiment "indicates that a militant minority of whites and blacks with
the aid of the national news media has pressured Congress into
passing civil rights laws to impose its will on the overwhelming
majority. Is this democracy or dictatorship? Viva Governor Kirk.
He represents the views of the exploited majority!" Other whites
also pointed to disenchanted African Americans to make their
point. One journalist wrote, "Although they haven't been as p u b
licly vocal as some of the white parents, many members of the
Negro community are considerably disturbed over the plan." That
same journalist lamented how busing interfered with education:
"Nothing works right because you have lost that sense of neighborhood community spirit."18
Defense of community, resistant to capricious forces of government and courts, found singular expression in widespread distaste for busing. The laws decreeing integration, personified by
the seemingly arbitrary decision handed down by Judge
Krentzmen, fueled a sense of victimization of "the exploited majority." Constant references to blacks who presumably shared white
parents' "common sense" in resenting the plan denied the reality
of the NAACP picketers outside the school building and rejected
implicitly the idea that African Americans could be part of the
community. Indeed, whites co-opted the language of the Civil
Rights movement by charging that the law failed to respect their
rights. School board attorney Cleary claimed "that the ACLU and
NAACP, who are basically strangers to the local community-their
national headquarters people-enjoy a favored position with the
court in comparison to the local school board." Unquestionably,
this marked a double standard. As one bystander put it, "many
Manateeans expect the United States to be mighty in the face of
North Vietnam and puny in the face of Claude Kirk." The point
remains, however, that in the eyes of white Manateeans, Kirk's
18. Bradanton Herald, 4, 14 April 1970; St. Petenburg Times, 19 April 1970; Sprenger
interview; Evers interview.
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actions represented a potent assertion of the right of communities
to self-rule-a populist cry that subsumed considerations of segregation or integration, even as it drew force from those same racial
factors.lg
Kirk's actions quickly reverberated throughout the state. On
Monday afternoon, Florida Attorney General Earl Faircloth, a
Democratic candidate for governor, declared Kirk's order "ineffective" on the basis that Kirk opened "a legal barrel of snakes" by
not justifying the reason for the suspension, which Faircloth
deemed unconstitutional. Republican members of the Florida legislature held fast in resisting bills proposed by Democratic legislators "with hopes of stealing some of Kirk's thunder." Democrats
countered that the state assembly was united against busing, but
they were confused on how to address the problem and accused
Kirk of "keep[ing] the center stage for himself." Clearly the legislature was afraid of being branded as pro-busing; one senator
referred to the dilemma as "the damndest box we've ever been in."
The St. Petmsburg Times noted that senators clung to the "pervasive
hope that the federal courts will solve the problem first."
Obligingly and without hesitation, Krentzrnen directed
Superintendent Jack Davidson to reclaim his office, and ordered
the governor to a hearing in his court on Tuesday, April 7, to jushis actions, an order which "delighted" Kirk: "That's what I've
been trying to do . . . [glet us, the people of Florida, our day in
Krentzmen's directives gained support from the Nixon White
House, where press secretary Ronald L. Ziegler announced that
the Justice Department stood ready to use more legal proceedings
or U.S. marshals to "cooperate and assist the court in carrying out
the court's order." Such intervention was of course what Nixon
19. St. Petersburg Times,1 April 1970;Bradenton Herald, 12 April 1970.
20. Bradenton Herald, 7 April 1970;St. Petershrg T i m , 11,12,13,
14 April 1970;
New Yod Tims,7 April 1970. Note that Manatee County school officials were
assisted by Florida congressmen William Cramer, a strong opponent of busing and an even stronger arch-enemy of Kirk; see consult Hathorn, "Cramer
v. Kirkn;Cleary interview. See the St. Pewburg Times,11 April 1970,for a summary of Florida newspaper editorials. The Manatee situation exacerbated the
persistent bickering and political maneuvering for control of the Republican
Party in Florida; see St. Petenburg Times,6 April 1970;Sanders, "Wrassling a
Governor," 353; Klingman, 155-95;Hathorn, "Cramer v. Kirk," 407-11,413;
Gregory Lee Baker, "IntrapartyFactionalism: The Florida Republican Party"
(M.A. thesis, University of Florida, 1976).
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wanted desperately to avoid. Earlier in his political career, Nixon
had supported the Brown decision and the Civil Rights Acts of 1957
and 1960. His administration attempted to put in place some policies with an eye towards improving the plight of black Americans.
The executive order creating the Office of Minority Business
Enterprise, the proposed Philadelphia Plan encouraging racial
quotas, and the attempt to extend the Voting Rights Act of 1965 all
showed a willingness to be associated with racial change.*'
With regard to busing, however, Nixon's position remained
one of carefully contrived vagueness. Obsessed with George
Wallace's ability to steal votes from his base of supporters, Nixon
moved gingerly on the issue. Under pressure from Southern senators, the administration backpedaled on enforcing integration
deadlines and fired Leon Panetta, Assistant Secretary of Health
Education and Welfare, for his overly vigorous attempts to push
through desegregation initiatives. However, Nixon also directed
the Internal Revenue Service to refuse tax-exempt status to private
schools that failed to adopt nondiscriminatory charters. As Nixon
put it to his aides, his policy on desegregation was "to keep it
confused." His speech on March 24,1970-two weeks before Kirk
took over in Manatee--granted one and a half billion dollars
for the enforcement of school desegregation. The same speech,
however, mixed a strong endorsement of integration ("The

21. Of the various biographies of Nixon and his dealing with busing, most help
h l for this essay was Hugh Davis Graham, "Richard Nixon and Civil Rights:
Explaining an Enigma," R s i d e n t k l Studies Quarterl~26 (winter 1996): 93106;
Lawrence J. McAndrews, "The Politics of Principle: Richard Nixon and
School Desegregation," Jmrnal ofNegro History 83 (summer 1998): 187-200.
See also Dean Kotlowski, Nixon's Civil Rights: Politics, Principle, and Poliq
(Cambridge, Mass., 2002); Hugh Davis Graham, T h Civil Rzghts Era: Origins
and Developmat of National Policy 19601972 (New York, 1990);Alvy L. King,
"Richard M. Nixon, Southern Strategies, and Desegregation of Public
Schools," in Richard M. Nixmr: Politician, President, Administrator, ed. Leon
Friedman and William F. Levantrosser (New York, 1991), 141-58; Hugh D.
Graham, "The Incoherence of the Civil Rights Policy in the Nixon
Administration," in Friedman and Levantrosser, eds., Richard M. Nixon, 15972; and the commentaries in that same volume by Robert H. Finch, 17375;
Sallyane Payton, 17685; and Roger Wilkins, 186-88. Nixon's papers, as well
as those of his aides in the National Archives, concentrate mostly on post-1970
events regarding the busing issue with only sporadic mention of Kirk; see particularly Leonard Garment's Desegregation/Busing file, White House Special
Files, Staff Member and Oltfice Files, Leonard Garment: box 64, folder 2,
Richard M. Nixon Presidential Materials, National Archives, College Park,
Md.

https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq/vol83/iss3/4

16

Houston: Voice of the Exploited Majority: Claude Kirk and the 1970 Manatee

constitutional mandate will be enforced") with the argument that
"transportation of children 'beyond normal school zones' should
not be required and racial segregation caused by housing patterns
should not be attacked by the federal government." His speech
put Nixon at odds with Krentzmen's orders, and Kirk zeroed in on
this tension during the Manatee crisis, for his coup contrasted dramatically with the "calculated waffle" that constituted Nixon's
stance. The New York Times commented that, in light of Nixon's socalled "Southern strategy" of wooing conservative Southerners to
the Republican Party, Kirk's revolt constituted "a potentially grave
political problemnand the administration was "approaching it with
extreme caution."22
Despite this tension, lines of communication between Kirk
and the administration remained open during his week in
Manatee, for the governor had extensive contacts in the Nixon
White House. Robert Finch, secretary of Health, Education, and
Welfare, was Kirk's friend fiom the Marine Corps; William Safire
had been employed by both Kirk and Nixon as a public-relations
specialist; even Attorney General John Mitchell and the President
himself were on close terms with Kirk, although the latter relationship had been sorely tried, especially after some backroom politicking at the 1968 Republican national convention. The
administration was none too pleased with Kirk's antics in
Bradenton; as many contemporary accounts noted, Nixon's precarious position meant he was "politically spread-eagled" by Kirk's
stance. With undoubtedly mock innocence, Kirk twisted the knife
as he met with the press on and off during the week's events in
Sanders, "Wrassling a Governor," 338,353; Maloy interview; Lloyd Hagarnan,
interview with the author, 1 July 2000; Robert Hoffman, interview with the
author, 3 April 2000, both in SPOHP-UF. At one point, Nixon, apparently
dreaming out loud according to his chief of staff H.R Haldeman, professed
a desire to "get a right-wing demagogue into some tough race and have him
go on the basis of anti-integration, would get enormous reaction, might even
win." Haldeman explained in a subsequent editorial comment that this was a
"fairly typical strategy on Nixon's part-i.e. to set up, or hope for, an external
extremist view to be launched which would in turn bring counterpressure on
the extremists of the other side instead of letting the current activist element
dominate the debate and the action," 19 February 1970 entry from H.R.
Haldeman, The Haldeman Diaries (New York, 1994), 129. For an inside perspective on the Nixon Administration and civil rights in the days up to (but
not including) the Manatee situation, see Leon Panetta and Peter Gall, Bring
Us Together (Philadelphia, 1971) . Panetta was unceremoniously ousted from
his position in Februaly 1970.
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Bradenton by citing Nixon's professed aversion to busing as rationale for his own actions. The administration thus remained trapped
by its duty to enforce Krentzmen's court order and discourage
intransigence, but carrying out those duties meant alienating voters central to Nixon's "Southern Strategy" and conveniently martyring Kirk. The governor, explained Time,"was shrewdly playing
on the ambiguities in the Nixon's administration p o l i ~ i e s . " ~ ~
Kirk, eager to maintain his newfound bully pulpit, disregarded
his ostensible desire to have his day in court and failed to appear
at the Tuesday hearing before Judge Krentzmen, using as a convenient excuse his required State of the State address before the
Florida Legislature. In his stead, Kirk sent former Governor and
former Florida Supreme CourtJustice Millard Caldwell as his legal
counsel. Caldwell pleaded unfamiliarity with the case, saying that
he had been retained only several hours before the hearing and
asked for time to become acquainted with the relevant legal literature. He also hinted at Kirk's real strategy when he responded to
Krentzmen's queries regarding a statement, widely attributed to
Kirk, in which the governor claimed he was not subject to
Krentzmen's jurisdiction. Caldwell surmised that Kirk meant only
that the U.S. Supreme Court would have jurisdiction in a case in
which the state opposed the federal courts. Kirk echoed this
theme in his State of the State address, calling the Manatee situation "a collision of the sovereignties" and advocating that everyone
"keep our cool, take events as they come, and plod painstakingly
down the road to nine justices of the United States Supreme
Court." Krentzmen accepted Kirk's excuse for not appearing but
ruled that Kirk's suspension of the school board left him responsible for the January 29 court order mandating busing. Krentzmen
subsequently directed Superintendent Davidson to resume office
23. Hoffman interview; Maloy interview; Kirk interview; William Safire, Before the
Fall (New York, 1975) 52, 114, 238; Time?20 April 1970; Newsweek, 20 April
1970. For references to Nixon, see Bradenton Herald, 6 April 1970; St.
Petetsbu'g Times, 14 April 1970; 'Executive Order suspending the Manatee
County board," Series 926, Box 3, Florida State Archives. Nixon and Kirk,
once quite amenable (Nixon went to Kirk's wedding, for example), had a
falling-out due to Kirk's endorsement of Nelson Rockefeller at the 1968
Republican Convention, motivated, many speculated, by Kirk's desire to be
named vice-president. Also key was Nixon's perceived involvement in the factionalism dividing the Florida Republican Party at the same time as the
Manatee crisis; see the New Y d Times, 7 April 1968; Bradenton Herald, 12 April
1970; Hathorn, 'Cramer v. Kirk," 40912.
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(as the deposed superintendent had not yet done so) and continue implementing the busing plan by the deadline of Thursday,
April 9. He also required Kirk to appear before him on Friday,
April 10, regarding possible contempt-ofsourt charges.24
As Davidson frantically attempted to undo the chaos created
by Kirk's interdiction and to reorient the school system towards
compliance with the busing plan, he was interrupted once again.
On Wednesday, April 8, the Governor re-suspended the school
board in pointed defiance of Judge Krentzmen, claiming that the
judge's legal authority did not extend to reinstating the board.
Kirk, apparently motivated by Faircloth's earlier charge, stated that
the school system's compliance with the court order equated to
"misfeasance, malfeasance, and neglect of duty." Kirk asserted,
moreover, that forced busing violated Florida laws, in part because
neighborhood schools were a legal right and because deprivation
of rights based on race was also illegal. Kirk's press secretary
Russell Stratton acknowledged that "We're trying to get this matter
to the Supreme
With Kirk's re-suspension order came a renewed federal
response and the climax to the week's events. At 3:00 a.m. on
Thursday morning, Oscar Blasingarne, Assistant U.S. Attorney in
Tampa, was roused by a call from his superior, John Briggs, and
asked to go to Bradenton and lead Superintendent Davidson back
to his office. Blasingame, thrilled at the unique opportunity,
arrived three hours later and contacted Davidson. He was greeted
around lunchtime by U.S. marshals John Barr, Felix Sharpe, and
Mickey Newberger, and the four men threaded their way through
hordes of news media to the superintendent's door.26
When the marshals entered the school building, they accompanied Kirk aides Lloyd Hagaman and Robert Dooley Hoffman
into a separate office with a contingent of plain-clothed Manatee
County sheriffs deputies while Florida Highway Patrolmen crept

24. A transcript of the hearing is available in the Claude Kirk Papers, Series 926,
Box 3, Florida State Archives. See also Bradenton Herald, 7, 8 April 1970; St.
Petersbu7g T i m , 8, 12 April 1970. Justice Caldwell was retained not only
because of his stature as a former Florida leader but because he was a previous employer of Judge Krentzmen, and the two apparently had a close relationship; see Cleary interview.
25. St. Petersburg Times, 9 April 19'70; "Governor's Proclamation," Kirk Papers,
Series 926, Box 3, Florida State Archives.
26. Blasingame interview; Newberger interview.

Published by STARS, 2004

19

Florida Historical Quarterly, Vol. 83 [2004], No. 3, Art. 4

into the adjoining superintendent's ofice, out of sight, as back-up
for the governor's aides. At this point, both newspaper accounts
and participants' recollections become convoluted and somewhat
contradictory, but apparently, the aides planned this arrangement
so they could converse with the marshals while having the deputies
as a buffer. The marshals asked the aides if they understood
Krentzmen's order to cease-anddesist. Hagaman replied that only
the Senate could override the governor's suspension of the board,
and given that no such action had occurred, they were legally entitled to stay and were willing to use force to do so. At this point,
Hagaman left to check for directions from Tallahassee via a WATS
line specially installed in the superintendent's office. In the meantime, Manatee County Sheriff Richard Weitzenfeld introduced
himself and his deputies, with handshakes all around, and stated
his intent to prevent the marshals from arresting the governor's
aides. After some conversation, Weitzenfeld took marshal Mickey
Newberger to the side and confided his nervousness, claiming that
Kirk had promised that Weitzenfeld would not be reelected if he
did not assist the governor's aides. Newberger, a 225pound former linebacker from Florida State University, assured Weitzenfeld
that he would go to jail if he followed Kirk's marching orders.
Hagaman and Hoffman reappeared and reiterated that their
directions were to defy the federal order. After conferring with
Blasingame, the marshals informed the aides that such defiance
would result in their arrest. Newberger, in a gesture of intimidation common to law enforcement officials, unbuttoned his suitcoat
to reveal his gun. Hagaman, a former law enforcement officer who
had been specially deputized so he could legally carry a pistol to
protect the governor in his daily duties, repeated the gesture to display his firearm and said jokingly, "Well, I hope it does not come
to this." At that point, the marshals informed the aides they were
under arrest and made a move for Hagaman's arm to handcuff
him, which prompted the sheriffs deputies to bodily block the
marshals into the wall while the governor's aides retreated hastily
into the superintendent's oflice, slamming and locking the door.27
27. Newberger interview; Hagaman interview; Hoffman interview; Blasingame
interview; Bradenton HeraZd, 9 April 1970; St. Petersburg Times, 10 April 1970;
New York Times,10 April 1970. Of particular importance are the depositions
that the marshals gave in court regarding this encounter; see their testimony
in the Claude Kirk Papers, Series 926, Box 3. For more on the police presence at the school building, see St. Petmburg Times, 10 April 1970.
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The marshals, suitably miffed, immediately began pounding
on the door, demanding entrance. Hagaman hollered in return
that the governor's contingent would ignore the order and that, if
the marshals broke the door down, they would be arrested for
destruction of public property. Simultaneously, the aides were on
the phone to Tallahassee reporting the details of the encounter to
the governor and asking what to do if the marshals persisted.
Hoffman later remembered that Kirk, in his own flip way, commanded "throw yourself in front of the doorn and talked to
Weitzenfeld to reinforce his earlier orders. After continued
yelling, the marshals asked Blasingame, who was nominally in
charge, if he wanted them to break the door down to arrest the
aides. Blasingame, ruing his earlier enthusiasm for this assignment and aware of the mass of reporters and cameras behind
them, decided a pause was in order. Addressing the media, he
raised his hands and requested that the media withdraw the microphones so he could confer with the marshals. The media contented themselves with pictures broadcast internationally of the
contingent huddled in conference outside the locked door.28
After consulting with their superiors, the marshals and
Blasingame let the confrontation die. Retreating to a Howard
Johnson's for coffee, they informed the press that they had succeeded in arresting the interlopers, although they were not "in cus
tody." Kirk, reached by reporters in the Tallahassee hospital where
his son had just been born, told journalists not to fret about his
potential arrest: "I know jujitsu, don't worry." As news of the
bizarre standaff spread, it was clear that tensions had skirted too
close to the edge of disaster, and recriminations flew fast and furious. U.S. Attorney John Briggs, Blasingame's superior, recounted
that a Kirk official had informed him that any federal marshal
attempting to enter the school board building would be "fired
upon." A Kirk aide, Don Meiklejohn, denied the charge elliptically, saying it was not a member of Kirk's staff but an intermediary,
"and we know what was said." Kirk, probably attempting to curtail
the rhetoric, said only that "we will resist only to the extent that
they attack us. We will just meet whatever comes to us, hopefully

28. Newberger interview; Hagaman interview; Hoffman interview; Blasingame
interview; B r h t o n Herald, 9 April 1970; St. Petmburg Times,10 April 1970;
NGUYmk T i m , 10 April 1970; court testimony, Kirk Papers, Series 926, Box 3.
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by turning the other cheek. The aggressors will have to come from
somewhere else."29
Clearly things were getting out of hand, and a negotiated settlement had to occur. At this point, as one aide to the governor
put it later, "we knew we were going to take the hit." An arranged
truce, negotiated through back-channels, defused the potential
conflict. Hagarnan and Hoffman were instructed to make an
appearance at the hearing scheduled for the next day in Judge
Krentzmen's courtroom. The open line to D.C. throughout the
Manatee crisis had yielded little for Kirk's cause. Although
described as a "love feast" by one account, the sticking point was
that the Nixon administration, at that time embarking on legal
arguments against busing in the Swann v. M e c k h h County
~
(North
Carolina) case, steadfastly refused Kirk's attempts to have the
Manatee County case represented in the legal briefs. It remains
unclear exactly the extent to which the Manatee incident represented an example of collusion or conflict between the Kirk and
Nixon administration^.^^ Regardless, both politicians benefited
from similar tactics of playing a shell game of waffling and ambiguity, especially in using the law as both shield and scapegoat for
political gain. For all of Kirk's bluster, he always emphasized that
his calculated resistance was aimed at getting clarification on busing from the Supreme Court, even though (as one reporter put it)
"what he is doing-and the way that he does it-may be so loud
that most people do not hear what he is saying." In the end, the
only difference is that Nixon more effectively straddled this fence,
and Kirk's belligerency seemed in retrospect to barely faze the
administration: "Amazingly," wrote Harry Dent, Nixon's political
aide in September 19'70, some five months after Manatee, "there
has been nothing approaching a 'Little R~ck."'~'
Before the arranged truce took effect, however, Kirk was determined to wring all possible publicity out of the situation.
Simultaneous to the filing of a petition requesting the U.S.
29. St. Petersbulg Times, 10, 12 April 1970; New Ymk Tim, 10 April 1970; Time, 20
April 1970; Hagaman interview, Hoffman intewiew; Newberger interview;
Blasingame interview. Researchen should also consult the Maloy interview.
30. Hoffman interview; Maloy interview; Hagaman interview; N m York Times, 9
April 1970; Bradentm Her& 12 April 1970; Sanders, "Wrasslinga Governor,"
34344.
31. Sanders, "Wrasslinga Governor,"343,358;McGirr, Stdudan Wanims, 2 11-15;
Harvey, A Question of Jurtice, 71,81.
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Supreme Court to establish jurisdiction over the Manatee County
case, and only hours before Judge Krentzmen decided whether to
hold the governor in contempt of court, Kirk met a final time with
federal government representatives. In this meeting (stage-managed by Gerald Mager, Kirk's legal counsel), Oscar Blasingame,
accompanied by a U.S. Marshals Service administrator A1 Butler
from Washington, returned to Bradenton to serve Hagaman and
Hoffman with a summons to appear before Krentzmen. They were
welcomed by Kirk sitting royally in the superintendent's office.
There was some confusion as to the conditions of the meeting, for
Blasingame, angered by the absence of the two aides, accused Kirk
of "reneging on a promise." After about thirty minutes of haggling, Kirk accepted the summons and promised to get the aides
to Tampa for Krentzmen's hearing. He then convened a triumphant press conference in his usual form, alternating quips
about his newborn son with attacks on the federal government,
and repeating his desire to abide by any decision that the U.S.
Supreme Court handed down. Asked if he would personally
engage marshals in further struggle, he answered, "One marine,
even an old one like me, can take on 100 of anything else."32
In Tampa, no such jocularity was apparent. In a hearing that
stretched over six hours, Krentzmen patiently allowed various parties to come forth and be heard, including a defiant Betty
Rushmore, chair of the Manatee school board, who declared that
"we had already desegregatedn to widespread applause from the
galleries. In the end, Krentzmen found Kirk guilty of contempt of
court and issued a last command for Kirk to stop his interference
in Manatee. He cited as his basis the various rulings handed down
against former rebellious governors Orval Faubus and Ross
Barnett. To back up his order, Krentzmen issued a fine of $10,000
per day, to accumulate until Kirk certified his acceptance of the
court order. A similar ruling, but with a fine of $1,000 per day, was
handed down for aides Hagaman and Hoffman, both of whom
made an appearance before Krentzmen but testified that they felt
duty-bound to obey the governor rather than the Court.
Hagaman, tom by conflicting responsibilities as a law-enforcement
officer and the governor's chief-ofstaff, could not help the tears

32. Blasingame interview; Hagaman interview; St. Petersbu~Times,11 April 1970;
Bradenton Herald, 10 April 1970.
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that resulted from Krentzmen's sympathetic but firm questioning.
Also found guilty of contempt of court but not fined was Manatee
County Sheriff Richard Weitzenfeld, who testified "in a tired voice"
that he would obey the court order.33
As the hearing dragged on, Kirk's contingent withdrew from
the school building in Bradenton. That evening, in a face-saving
address televised across Florida, Kirk claimed "worthwhile
progress" in negotiating a truce with the Justice Department. In
return for reinstating the school officials of Manatee County, he
assured his audience that the Justice Department would henceforth plan its litigation in desegregation cases in tandem with the
state rather than on "a county-bycounty basis." The Justice
Department also agreed to recommend to the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals that the Manatee County case be reviewed, without taking a position on whether the plan should be changed.
Reaffirming his belief that "the solution to our problems must lie
in the duly constituted courts," Kirk professed his willingness to
have gone to jail had it helped the cause, but as it stood, "I believe
we are on the road to v i ~ t o r y . " ~
The Justice Department's take differed markedly from Kirk's
speech. In a written communication for the U.S. Supreme Court,
although suggestingJudge Krentzmen had erred in his selection of
Plan B, Solicitor General Erwin Griswold also remarked pointedly
that "any confrontation between the Governor and the United
States would be entirely of his own making." Griswold also scolded Kirk for his selective acknowledgment of legal authority: "It is
inadmissable that any officer-high or low-will not obey the
order of any court but this court." Opinions from Kirk's former
supporters were even harsher. Jerome Pratt, state legislator from
Manatee County and an attorney for anti-busing citizen's groups,
branded Kirk's handling of the affair as "the cruelest hoax ever
perpetrated" and "the most colossal, stupendous . . . political
hypocrisy I have ever seen displayed." Kirk, in turn, responded
that he knew all along "he could go up to the point of force, but
33. Court transcript, Kirk Papers, Series 926, Box 3; New York Times, 11, 12 April
1970; St. Petersburg Times, 12 April 1970; Brudmton Herald, 11 April 1970;
Hagaman interview; Hoffman interview; Benjamin Krentzmen, video interview, SPOHP-UF.
34. St. Petersburg Times, 13 April 1970; New Ymk Times, 11 April 1970; Bradenton
HeraZd, 12,13 April 1970. Full texts of Kirk's speech are avaiIable in Bradenton
Herald, 13 April 1970; St. Petersburg Times, 14 April 1970.
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not beyondn in his intervention, and "as I anticipated, the federal
government did not use force." He also scolded the news media for
treating his actions as anti-integration, rather than anti-busing:
"[tlo the editorial writers who would continue to classlfy us as
racists . . . I cannot say publicly what I would like to say to them."55
Despite the hoopla, calmness quickly returned to the county.
After the week's delay, school buses began to roll across Manatee
County, by most accounts "quietly and orderly." Approximately 2,600
students, out of a school system of 17,000, rode the buses that day,
and absenteeism ran only slightly higher than usual. In the end, the
disproportionate numbers of bused pupils were African American.
Later that week, on April 20, 1970, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected
Kirk's motion to transfer the Manatee County case to itsjurisdiction.
The nation's attention soon turned towards the Apollo 13crisis, hundreds of thousands of miles away in outer space.56
The dizzying turn of events and vociferous dissension that
characterized the whole matter spills over into interpretations of
Kirk's administration to this day. Conventional wisdom remains
that Manatee epitomized everything wrong with Kirk; emblematic
of his reckless grandstanding and insatiable appetite for publicity,
the confrontation figured in his failed bid for re-election in 1970.
His aides, by contrast, maintain loyally to this day that his actions
in Manatee, while certainly uncompromising, displayed a sense of
principle all too rare among politicians. Regardless, Kirk's dubious tactics-in contesting the Manatee case within the courts,
while exploiting his illegal actions relentlessly for political gainwere both inherently contradictory and ineffective. Statewide,
Kirk alienated voters on both ends of the political spectrum, those
disgusted with his actions in Manatee in the first place and those
who felt that he abandoned them at week's end. From the perspective of white Manateeans, the ill-starred antics of Kirk, which
reflected their beliefs but ultimately bore no fmit, led to a feeling
of being used and exploited by politicians to little gain, reinforcing
the distaste for politics as usual. To this day, some Bradenton res35. Brcrdenton Herald, 13,17, 19 April 1970; Neu YorR Tzms, 13, 14 April 1970; St.
Petemburg Tames, 14, 15, 17 April 1970.
36. St. Petnsburg Tames, 17 April 1970; N m Ymk Times, 15 April 1970; Braahton
HeraM, 20 April 1970; Cleary interview. Some of those absentee children
enrolled in private academies, including some run by the Manatee County
Citizens' Councils; see the St. Petemburg Taws, 17 April 1970; Bashaw interview.
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idents foster a sense of "disappointment" and "betrayal" occasioned by Kirk's retreat from their defense. "We were kind of like
a political football being kicked around," recalled school board
member Dr. Thomas S ~ r e n ~ e rIn
. ~some
'
ways, the racial issue was
comparatively muted by other factors: the prospect of violence
between state and federal law-enforcement representatives
undoubtedly figured most prominently in the minds of white voters; the palpable sense that law and order was breaking down outweighed the political appeal of symbolically resisting federal
authority. If the Manatee episode was politically calculated, as to
some degree it must have been, it was a miscalculation and perhaps a missed chance to lead.38
Because Kirk lost his re-election campaign to Reubin Askew,
and because 1970, known as the birth of "the New New South,"
brought about the election of three similar Southern governors
heralded as "new populists," historians see this year as a watershed.
These victorious governors indicated to many commentators and
subsequent historians that the white South was repudiating massive resistance politics for a new era of racial toleration. But as Kirk
and Nixon displayed a fundamental relationship despite their differences, so too did Kirk wear the mantle of populist quite well.
Askew's campaign manager noted that voters were "angry at government and politics . . . it was the same advantage Kirk enjoyed in
1966." One journalist saw this tendency in the support for George
Wallace's 1972 anti-busing campaign in Florida and called it "a
kind of perverted populism-the same complaint against insensitive, inflexible, over-sized government that the late Robert F.
Kennedy voiced in 1968 and Askew in 1970, although Wallace's
version was hollow and void of positive alternative^."^^ The

37. Kallina, Claude Kirk and the Politics of Crm.ntatzon, 183; Sprenger interview.
38. All interviewees commented on Kirk's handling of the Manatee crisis; see also
Kallina, Claude Kirk and the Politics of C o n . t a t i o n , 17683; Orfield, M w t We
Bus?,329, which signals that the Justice Department's condemnation of Kirk
was stronger in rhetoric than in reality; St. Petershrg T i m , 7, 14 April 1970;
Sanders, "Wrassling a Governor, 35658; Dan T. Carter, The Politics of*:
G e ~ g eWallace, T k Origins of the Nezu Conservatism, and the Transformation of
American Politics (New York, 1995).
39. Halberstam, "Claude Kirk and the Politics of Promotion," 3536; Dauer,
"Florida:The Different State,"94; Nezu Ymk Times, 13 October 1970; Hooker,
"Busing, Governor Askew, and the Florida Primary," 30; also Bass and
DeVries, The T r a n s f m t i o n of Southern Politics, 126, which interpreted
Wallace and Askew as appealing to the same alienated voter.
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populist tag, in the case of Askew, was attractive enough to entice
the Florida chairmen of both the 1968 George Wallace and Eugene
McCarthy campaigns to endorse Askew in 1970. It appeared that
populism spread across ideological boundaries, or as historian Dan
T. Carter observed, "had become so elastic it had little meaning."
Any understanding of the 1970s as populist must incorporate the
dynamics behind George Wallace, Boston's anti-busing proponents, and Claude Kirk, rather than privilege 1970s populism as
analogous only to racial moderation.@ Politicians of the late 1960s
and the 19'70sshared a politics of style and a style of politics, even
as they took contrasting leadership on racial issues.
As Manatee confronted the busing issue, the county's voters
displayed the contradictions and similarities in these shifting definitions of a new political terrain. The situation revealed a political
relationship intertwining an old style of politics with a new style of
voter. The mixture of Southerners,Easterners, and Midwesterners
in Manatee demonstrates the idea of local autonomy and its powerful hold in unlfylng white communities in the 19'70s. Fortified
by a new language of populist appeal that transcended party and
region, this political persuasion sparked voter passions in the
1970s, even as the ever-present issue of race lurked-sometimes
openly, sometimes covertly-under the surface of other, more personal issues. Manatee County by 1970was comfortable with a type
of integration that allowed many of its citizens to avoid thinking of
themselves as segregationists and fretted not at all with the reality
and parameters of their still-segregated society.
This is particularly borne out by the fight for neighborhood
schools, which traded some school integration by busing African
Americans in return for preserving white neighborhoods. When
40. Sanders, Mighty Peculiar Ebctions, 1-10; Carter, The Politics of Rage, 3344;
Sanders, "Wrassling a Governor," 191, 205; McGirr, S h r b a n Warrims, 211,
239; Lamis, The Two-Pa* South, 179,18587. The new governors were Ruebin
Askew (Florida), Dale Bumpers (Arkansas), Jimmy Carter (Georgia), and
Linwood Holton (Virginia), but this interpretation ignores the stylistic
changes that allowed even George Wallace to win re-election in 1970 (see
Carter, The Politics of Rage, 417). Harvey, A Question of Justice, 2-3, 170,
acknowledges the "misleading" nature of "populist" in comparing these governors with both their Progressive and massive resistance era counterparts.
See also the Time cover story devoted to the new governors, 31 May 1971. It
should also be noted that both Claude Kirk and George Wallace used aggressive rhetoric and showmanship to obscure fairly liberal tendencies: see Nat
Reed, interview with lulian M. Pleasants, 2, 3 November 2000, SPOHP-UF,
Sprenger interview.
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Betty Rushmore declared to a packed courtroom that "we had
desegregated," she was absolutely right: Manatee had integrated in
a diffused, piece-meal, and token fashion entirely consistent with
the geographic origins of many Manateeans. The central dilemma
for Manatee and the nation remained the point at which the percentage of African Americans in a given school represented integration rather than tokenism, and answers were varied and
complicated. Scholar Gary Orfield noted that two symbolically
rich but mutually incompatible goals-of integration on the one
hand versus neighborhood schools on the other-ran face-first
into each other. Claude Kirk, Manatee County, and the busing
issue of the 1970s exhibited the reality that only government could
solve the problems facing Americans, and yet government was perceived as the problem. Busing fragmented America because it
highlighted the idea that whites should sacrifice for integration,
and the extent to which this could or would happen became
fraught with bitter di~agreement.~~
With the politics of busing, as in so many other things, Claude
Kirk found himself ahead of his times. Critics and supporters
agree that his antics trail-blazed new patterns in Florida politics
and power, even as he self-imploded into near-caricature. This
pattern is upheld by the Manatee County busing incident, which,
while treated superficially by most, is a microcosm of a deeper
dynamic at work. As the 1960s and 1970s accelerated political and
cultural shifts that would send Sunbelt suburbs under the
Republican tent, there was a converging of demographic shifts, a
politics based on symbolism, confrontation, and image, and the
transformation of a country shaken by social divisions. By refashioning the tactics of a bygone era for a new generation of voters,
Kirk presaged three decades of political activity. Nearly thirty years
after the event, Kirk declared that the substance of his stance in
Manatee had not hampered his re-election campaign so much as
the timing: " [Floridians] didn't understand forced busing at the
time. It hadn't hit enough families. It is still a cancer today."
Although his actions often contradicted principles of law and

41. St. Petenburg T i m , 12 April 1970; Hooker, "Busing,Governor Askew, and the
Florida Primary,"24; Bob Woodward and Scott Armstrong, The Brethren: Inside
th Supreme Court (New York, 1979)' 9596, regarding integration versus desegregation; Orfield, M w t We Bus?, 103; McAndrews, "The Politics of Principle,"
196-97; Bashaw interview.
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order and common sense, it hardly mattered to many: his defense
of the values of community autonomy and local control spoke
emphatically, not so much to Southern segregationists of the past,
but to a new America. Although geographically rooted in Sunbelt
Florida, Manatee was instead an outpost, both literally and figuratively, of Southerners and Midwesterners, and even a few
Northeasterners, all of whom preferred to subordinate racial issues
to more personal concerns.42
In the end, there was statewide outrage at Kirk's antics from
politicians and pundits alike. There was a sense of disappointment
and even betrayal from his audience in Manatee County.
Nonetheless, in his failed bid for re-election the following autumn,
Manatee County's votes were solidly in Kirk's column. It would be
a harbinger of things to come.

42. Kirk interview; Carter, The Politics of Rage, 377-81, 425-6, 465-7; idem, F m
George W a k e to Newt Gingrich: Race in the Conseruative Counterrevolution, 19631994 (Baton Rouge, La., 1996); Thomas Byrne Edsall with Mary D. Edsall,
Chain Reaction: The Impact of Race, Rights, and Taxes on American Politics (New
York, 1992); Gerard Alexander, "The Myth of the Racist Republicans," in
Claremant Rarieu of Book 4 (spring 2004), http:/ /www.claremont.org/writings/crb/spring2004/alexander.html.
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